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Abstract 
Across two experiments, we demonstrate that emotional states influence how receptive people 
are to advice. We focus on incidental emotions, emotions triggered by a prior experience that is 
irrelevant to the current situation. We find that people who feel incidental gratitude are more 
trusting and more receptive to advice than are people in a neutral emotional state, and that people 
in a neutral state are more trusting and more receptive to advice than are people who feel 
incidental anger. In our setting, greater receptivity to advice increased judgment accuracy. 
People who felt incidental gratitude were more accurate than were people in a neutral state, and 
people in a neutral state were more accurate than were people who felt incidental anger. Our 
results offer insight into how people use advice, and identify conditions under which leaders, 
policy makers, and advisors may be particularly influential.   
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Blinded by Anger or Feeling the Love: 
How Emotions Influence Advice Taking 
 
 
Advice is probably the only free thing  
which people won’t take. 
Lothar Kaul 
 
Before choosing a career path, deciding where to live, or selecting a physician, people 
frequently receive advice from others. Advice plays a particularly important role in 
organizations. For example, managers often receive professional advice from consultants before 
undertaking a major initiative, such as launching a new product, merging with a competitor, or 
downsizing (O’Shea & Madigan, 1997; Shapiro, Eccles, & Soske, 1993). Sometimes, people are 
heavily influenced by the advice they receive. Other times, they reject it entirely.   
Prior research has found that when people have an opinion of their own, they consistently 
discount the opinion of others relative to their own (e.g., Larrick & Soll, 2006; Yaniv & Foster, 
1997; Yaniv, 2004). However, characteristics of both the advisor and the decision influence how 
receptive people are to advice. For example, people are more likely to take advice from known 
experts (Goldsmith & Fitch, 1997; Harvey & Fischer, 1997; Sniezek, Schrah, & Dalal, 2004) and 
from people who are older, wiser, better educated, or more experienced than the person receiving 
advice (Feng & MacGeorge, 2006). Individuals also tend to weigh advice more heavily when the 
decision domain is difficult (Gino & Moore, 2007) and when the advice was costly to obtain 
(Gino, 2007; Patt, Bowles, & Cash, 2006). 
Although people may have many reasons to reject or take the advice they receive from 
others, prior research has failed to consider the role that emotions might play in the advice taking 
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process. Emotions may influence advice taking in several ways. First, the person receiving 
advice may feel emotions for or related to the person giving the advice. Second, the decision 
itself may be affect rich. For example, the decision to place one’s parents in a nursing facility 
and sell their house is likely to trigger many emotions. Third, incidental emotions that stem from 
a prior, unrelated experience may influence how responsive individuals are to advice. 
No prior work has investigated how internal states, such as the decision maker’s 
emotional state, influence advice taking. We postulate that emotions significantly influence how 
receptive people are to advice. In this article, we focus on the influence of incidental emotions. 
The emotions literature distinguishes between integral emotions, emotions triggered by the 
current situation, and incidental emotions, emotions triggered by a prior, unrelated experience 
(Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003). Normatively, incidental emotions should not influence current 
judgments or decisions.  
We conceptualize our study of incidental emotions as a conservative test of the role 
emotions play in advice taking. Integral emotions are likely to exert a stronger influence on 
advice taking than incidental emotions. Unlike incidental emotions that individuals may correctly 
attribute to a prior situation, integral emotions cannot be correctly attributed to a prior situation. 
In addition, incidental emotions that result from a prior experience are likely to decay over time. 
Integral emotions are generated from the decision context itself and are more likely than 
incidental emotions to be infused into the decision process. 
Advice Taking and Affect 
Advice taking involves a complex decision process, and prior work has argued that 
complex decision processes are most susceptible to the influence of affect (e.g., Fiedler, 1991; 
Forgas, 1995; 1999a; 1999b, 2002). Prior affect research has identified a number of ways in 
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which affect (moods and emotions) influences important judgments and behaviors. For example, 
prior work has found that affect influences important organizational behaviors, such as pro-social 
behavior (Bartlett & DeSteno, 2006; George & Brief, 1992), work performance (Beal, Weiss, 
Barros, & MacDermid, 2005; Grandey, 2000), job satisfaction (Brief & Weiss, 2002; Judge & 
Ilies, 2004), group outcomes (George, 1990; Ilies, Wagner, & Morgeson, 2007), and negotiations 
(George, Jones, & Gonzalez, 1998; Moran & Schweitzer, 2008). 
Several studies have also linked affect with judgments and behaviors that are closely 
related to advice taking. For instance, scholars have found that positive moods increase liking 
(Gouaux, 1971; Veitch & Griffitt, 1976), helping and generosity (Isen, 1970; Isen & Levin, 
1972). Drawing upon these findings, Jones and George (1998: 534) conjectured that:  
Experiencing positive moods or emotions may cause one to have more positive 
perceptions of others and see the world through ‘rose-colored glasses,’ resulting in a 
heightened experience of trust in another person. Conversely, negative moods and 
emotions may add a negative tone to interactions and may result in an individual 
perceiving others as less trustworthy than they actually are. 
 
In this paper, we are particularly interested in the relationship between affect and trust. 
Consistent with prior research (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005: 726; Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & 
Camerer, 1998), we define trust as “the willingness to accept vulnerability based upon positive 
expectations about another’s behavior.” Across several experiments, Dunn and Schweitzer 
(2005) examined the link between emotions and trust. Results from their work demonstrate that 
incidental emotions significantly influence trust. Specifically, Dunn and Schweitzer (2005) found 
that negatively valenced emotions, such as anger, decrease trust and positively valenced 
emotions, such as happiness and gratitude, increase trust.  
Other work has found that trust is positively associated with advice taking. The more an 
individual trusts the advisor, the more influenced that individual is by the advice (Sniezek & Van 
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Swol, 2001). We build upon this work to explore the role of incidental emotions in advice taking. 
In this article, we focus on the exchange of advice at the dyadic level. It is important to note, 
however, that advice can be exchanged between two individuals, among multiple individuals, or 
between groups. Our findings offer insight into situations in which one person is responsible for 
a final decision, but before committing to a decision, she or he receives advice from another 
person. 
Hypotheses  
Prior research has found that the judgments people make are influenced by their current 
feelings, even when they should not be (Schwarz & Clore, 1983). For example, Schwarz and 
Clore (1988) documented a significant relationship between positive and negative moods 
triggered by the current weather (e.g., whether it is currently sunny or cloudy) on judgments of 
overall life satisfaction. 
In this article, we consider the misattribution of two specific emotions, anger and 
gratitude, when people make judgments about relying upon advice. Anger and gratitude 
represent emotions with opposing valence. Anger is a negatively valenced emotion. Gratitude is 
a positively valenced emotion. Anger and gratitude, however, are similar insofar as both are 
characterized by other-person control: both anger and gratitude are typically triggered by the 
actions of others (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).  
In related work, Dunn and Schweitzer (2005) postulated that individuals are more likely 
to misattribute emotions when the nature of the judgment task matches the dimensions of the 
incidental emotion. In their studies, Dunn and Schweitzer (2005) found that individuals 
misattributed incidental emotions characterized by other-person control (e.g., anger and 
gratitude) when they made judgments about other people. Interestingly, individuals did not 
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misattribute incidental emotions characterized by individual control (emotions such as guilt and 
pride that are typically triggered by one’s own actions) when making judgments about other 
people. Dunn and Schweitzer (2005) found that people who experience incidental anger are far 
less trusting than are people who experience incidental gratitude.  
In our studies, participants made judgments that involve relying upon the advice of 
others. We expect emotions characterized by high other-person control (e.g., anger and gratitude) 
to be misattributed in these other-person related judgments. We expect trust to play an important 
role in the advice-taking process. Prior research has identified trust as a key moderator of advice 
taking (Sniezek & Van Swol, 2001). The more individuals trust their advisors, the more 
influenced they are by the advice they receive. We integrate Dunn and Schweitzer’s (2005) 
findings linking emotions and trust with Sniezek and Van Swol’s (2001) findings linking trust 
and advice taking to test the thesis that incidental emotions influence how much individuals trust 
others and how receptive they are to advice. Specifically, we test the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Compared to individuals in a neutral state, individuals who experience 
incidental anger will be less receptive to advice. 
Hypothesis 2: Compared to individuals in a neutral state, individuals who experience 
incidental gratitude will be more receptive to advice. 
Hypothesis 3: Trust will mediate the relationship between incidental emotions and 
reliance upon advice.   
We do not develop specific hypotheses with respect to the effect of incidental emotions 
on judgment accuracy. We expect incidental emotions to influence how receptive people are to 
advice, but the effects of incidental emotions on accuracy will depend very heavily upon 
characteristics of the decision context. Specifically, the effects of incidental emotions on 
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judgment accuracy will be influenced by how accurate decision makers’ initial estimates are, 
how accurate the advice is, and how receptive decision makers are to advice in a neutral 
emotional state (e.g., by factors such as how much education the advisor has). For example, if 
individuals are generally unreceptive to advice, have accurate estimates, and receive bad advice, 
incidental gratitude, which we expect to cause individuals to increase their reliance upon advice, 
is likely to harm judgment accuracy. If, however, individuals are generally unreceptive to advice, 
have inaccurate estimates, and receive good advice, incidental gratitude is likely to improve 
judgment accuracy.  
Overview of Present Research 
We test our hypotheses in two studies. In our first study, we investigate the effects of 
incidental anger and incidental gratitude on advice taking. In our second study, we explore the 
role of trust in mediating the influence of emotions on advice taking. We investigate these 
hypotheses in a context in which participants typically underweight advice.  
Experiment 1 
Methods 
Participants. One hundred nine undergraduates (50% male) at Carnegie Mellon 
University participated in the study in exchange for course credit in their introductory business 
courses. Participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 24 (M = 20.28, SD = 1.23). Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of three emotion-induction conditions.  
Design and Procedure. We asked participants to engage in a repeated judgment task. 
Participants sat in private cubicles with no visual access to other participants. To mitigate 
potential demand effects, we informed participants that the experiment included two unrelated 
short studies. Participants listened to an audio clip that explained the task entitled “weight 
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estimation study.”  While listening to the audio clip, participants had an instruction sheet that 
included a screen shot from Part I of the study. Once participants finished listening to the audio 
clip, a new screen appeared which prompted participants to: “Please click continue when you are 
ready to begin Part I of the Weight Estimation Study (Study 1).” 
Estimation task (Part I). Part I of the weight estimation study consisted of an estimation 
task with 3 rounds. In each round, participants saw a picture of a person and were asked to 
estimate the weight of the person in the picture.  
Measure of baseline affect. At the end of Part I of the weight estimation study, we 
measured participants’ baseline affect. The instructions read, “On the next page, you will see a 
number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. Read each item and then click the 
appropriate answer for that word. Indicate to what extent you feel each emotion RIGHT NOW.”  
Drawing on prior studies (Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Lerner, Small, & Loewenstein, 2004), 
participants completed a commonly used affect inventory (Gross, Sutton, & Ketelaar, 1998) that 
asked them to rate the extent to which they presently felt each of 19 different emotion items on a 
9-point scale.1 The response scale ranged from 0 (not at all) to 8 (more strongly than ever).  
Emotion induction. We used induction procedures very similar to those used in prior 
studies (e.g., Lerner et al., 2004). Our instructions explained the task as one assessing 
imagination: “For Study 2, we will ask you to view a short video clip. After the video clip, we will 
have you reflect on the video clip in writing for about five minutes. Later on we will ask you 
some more questions about the video clip and your experience watching it. Just as a reminder, 
you are free to discontinue the study at any time without penalty. If at any point you wish to 
cease watching the clip, you may cover your eyes, stop listening, and/or stop watching all 
                                                 
1 The emotions were: afraid, amused, angry, grateful, bored, cheerful, depressed, disgusted, fearful, furious, happy, 
indifferent, mad, appreciative, nervous, neutral, thankful, sad, unemotional. 
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together. Before viewing the video clip, we would like you to sit back and relax for a minute or 
so. Try to clear your mind and take a couple of deep breaths. This will help you focus on the 
imagination study.”   
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three emotion induction conditions: a 
gratitude condition, an anger condition, or a neutral condition. As in prior emotion research 
(Lerner et al., 2004), we showed participants one of three different video clips. In the anger 
condition, participants watched an angry video clip (from the movie My Bodyguard), portraying 
a man being treated unfairly. In the gratitude condition, participants watched a gratitude video 
clip (from the movie Awakenings), showing a scene in which a man receives an unexpected favor 
from his co-workers. In the control condition, participants watched a neutral clip (from a 
National Geographic special), portraying fish at the Great Barrier Reef.2 Each clip lasted less 
than 4 minutes. Immediately after viewing the clips, participants wrote about how they would 
feel if they were in the situation depicted in the clip (anger condition and gratitude condition) or 
about their daily activities (neutral condition). After the writing task, participants were given 
instructions for the second part of the weight estimation study. 
Estimation task (Part II). In Part II of the weight estimation study, participants viewed 
the same pictures they saw in the first part of the weight estimation study. Across three rounds, 
we asked participants to provide estimates for the weight of the person in the picture. This time, 
however, we provided participants with the estimates that another participant had purportedly 
made for the same set of photos. We kept these values constant across participants and 
conditions (i.e., each participant received the same set of estimates from “another participant” for 
                                                 
2 While both the neutral clip and the anger clip have been previously used in emotion research, the gratitude clip 
(1:02:34 to 1:04:02 in Awakenings, ISBN-0-8001-7736-3) was created by the authors and used for the first time in 
the studies presented here after thorough pre-testing. 
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each of the three pictures). We determined these values prior to the study. Each value was equal 
to the true weight plus or minus a random number between 2 and 10 pounds.   
Self-report questionnaire. After completing Part II of the Weight Estimation Study, 
participants completed a measure of subjective feelings (Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Lerner et al., 
2004) which included the same list of emotions we used to measure participants’ baseline affect. 
The instructions for this part of the experiment read: “Please think back to the writing task and 
video clip from the Imagination Study (Study 2). On the following page, please indicate to what 
extent the video clip and writing task made you feel each emotion. A “0” on this scale means 
that you did not experience the emotion at all. An “8” means that you experienced the emotion 
more strongly than ever before.”  These emotion manipulation checks were included in the study 
after the main dependent variable since prior work has shown that labeling one’s feelings after an 
incidental emotion induction can reduce the effect of such emotions (Keltner, Locke, & Audrain, 
1993; Schwarz & Clore, 1983). 
We aggregated responses to nine of these items to create composite measures of 
gratitude, neutral affect, and anger. To measure gratitude, we averaged responses for grateful, 
appreciative, and thankful (α = .96). To measure neutral affect, we averaged responses for 
neutral, indifferent, and unemotional (α = .88). To measure anger, we averaged responses for 
angry, furious, and mad (α = .98). 
Final questionnaire and debriefing. Finally, participants provided demographic 
information, and we concluded by informing participants that the film clip could have caused 
distress and that the feelings would wear away (Keltner et al., 1993; Schwarz & Clore, 1983). 
Participants reported enjoying the study, and no participants reported an adverse reaction. 
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Dependent measure. As in prior advice taking research, we measured the extent to which 
participants relied upon advice by using the “weight of advice” (WOA) measure to gauge the 
extent to which participants revised their estimates in the direction of the other participant’s 
estimate (Harvey & Fischer, 1997; Yaniv & Foster, 1997). The WOA is a ratio measure that 
varies from zero (when the final estimate is equal to the initial estimate and the advice has no 
influence on the final estimate) to one (when the final estimate is exactly the same as the advice). 
The measure is computed as follows: . WOA values between 
0 and 1 indicate partial discounting of advice. If participants are equally well informed, they 
should equally weight their own and another person’s estimate, and the normative WOA score is 
0.5 (Larrick & Soll, 2006); WOA values less than 0.5 indicate underweighting of advice and 
WOA values greater than 0.5 indicate overweighting of advice. 
Results  
In both Study 1 and Study 2, we first conducted analyses including gender and age as 
independent variables. In Study 2, we also included occupational status as an independent 
variable. We found no main effects or interaction effects for any of these demographic variables, 
and we thus report our findings collapsed across demographic groups.  
Emotions manipulation check. In analyzing our results, we compared responses to the 
emotion measures across conditions. We report these results in Table 1. Consistent with our 
manipulations, participants in the gratitude condition reported more gratitude than either anger 
(t[70] = 9.51, p < .001, d = 2.27) or neutral feelings (t[70] = 5.71, p < .001, d = 1.36). 
Participants in the anger condition reported more anger than either gratitude (t[70] = 7.45, p < 
.001, d = 1.78) or neutral feelings (t[70] = 7.00, p < .001, d = 1.67). Participants in the neutral 
estimateinitialadvice
estimateinitialestimatefinal
WOA 

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condition reported feeling more neutral than either grateful (t[72] = 2.84, p < .01, d = 0.67) or 
angry (t[72] = 7.00, p < .001, d = 1.65). 
Advice taking. Supporting our thesis, results from a repeated-measures ANOVA 
demonstrate that the emotion manipulations significantly influenced advice-taking, F (2, 91) = 
28.76, p < .001, η2 = .39 (see Table 2). The mean WOA in the gratitude condition was 
significantly higher than it was in both the neutral condition (t[71] = 4.89, p < .001, d = 1.16) and 
the anger condition (t[70] = 6.96, p < .001, d = 1.66). The mean WOA in the anger condition was 
significantly lower than it was in the neutral condition (t[71] = 2.45, p = .017, d = 0.58). These 
results demonstrate that incidental emotions influence advice taking. 
Judgment accuracy. Our results show that the emotion manipulations significantly 
influenced the accuracy of participants’ final estimates, F (2, 106) = 3.89, p = .023, η2 = .07 (see 
Table 3). For each judgment, we measured accuracy by computing the absolute difference 
between the true weight and the participant’s estimate. Smaller values represent greater accuracy. 
As expected, there was no difference in the accuracy of participants’ initial estimates across 
conditions (p = .58). However, the final estimates of participants in the gratitude condition were 
significantly more accurate than they were for people in both the neutral condition (t[71] = 2.18, 
p = .033, d = 0.51) and the anger condition (t[70] = 2.56, p = .013, d = 0.60). Similarly, accuracy 
improved more in the gratitude condition than it did in both the neutral condition (t[71] = 3.67, p 
< .001, d = 0.86) and the anger condition (t[70] = 3.38, p = .001, d = 0.79). We conducted 
mediation analysis (Baron & Kenny, 1986), and we found that participants’ use of advice 
(measured by WOA) mediated the relationship between the emotion condition and the accuracy 
of final estimates (Sobel test, Z = 3.91, p < .001). We depict these mediation results in Figure 1. 
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--------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
Discussion 
In Study 1, we find support for Hypotheses 1 and 2. Participants who experienced 
incidental gratitude weighed advice more heavily than did participants in a neutral state. 
Participants who experienced incidental anger weighed advice less heavily than did participants 
in a neutral state. Even though the emotions induced in this study were unrelated to the judgment 
task, we find that these emotions significantly changed the extent to which participants relied 
upon advice.  
Experiment 2 
In our second study, we extend our investigation to explore the role of trust in mediating 
the relationship between emotions and advice taking. In our second study, we employ methods 
similar to those we used in Study 1. 
Methods 
Participants. We recruited participants through ads in which participants were offered 
money to participate in an experiment. A total of 107 individuals (50% female) agreed to 
participate. The average age of participants was 21 (SD = 2.68). Most participants were 
undergraduate students (95% of them) from local universities. Participants expected to 
participate in two unrelated studies. As in Study 1, participants were randomly assigned to one of 
three emotion-manipulation conditions. Participants received a flat payment of $7 for their 
participation. 
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Materials and Procedure. We used similar methods to those we employed in Study 1, but 
in Study 2 we asked participants to answer trust inventory questions before they provided their 
second weight estimate (before Part II of the weight estimation study). These questions asked 
participants how much they trusted the participant whose estimates they received in the second 
part of the weight estimation study. Specifically, before Phase 2 we informed participants that, 
“The person whose estimates you will be able to see previously participated in the weight 
estimation study. Although you have limited information about this participant, we would like 
you to evaluate this person and answer a number of questions. The questions are presented on 
the next screen. Please answer each of them on a 1-7 scale.  Ratings range from 1 [not likely at 
all] to 7 [very likely]. We will refer to the participant as Participant 11.”  
The trust inventory measured expectations of trustworthiness and intentions to trust 
another person. Prior research has demonstrated that incidental emotions influence trust in 
unfamiliar targets (Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005), and in this study we asked participants to report 
how much they trusted the participant whose estimates they received. We used an adapted 
version of a 10-item trust inventory (see Dunn & Schweitzer, 2005; Johnson-George & Swap, 
1982). We list the items we used in the Appendix. For each item (e.g., “I would expect 
Participant 11 to pay me back if I loaned him/her $40”), participants chose a value from a 7-point 
scale (1: not at all likely, 7: very likely). The 10 trust inventory items were closely related (α = 
.95), and we used an average of the 10 questions for our analyses. 
Results 
Emotions manipulation check. As in Study 1, the emotion scales showed high internal 
consistency: gratitude (α = .96), anger (α = .97), and neutral affect (α = .89). We report average 
ratings for each emotion condition in Table 1. Participants in the gratitude condition reported 
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more gratitude than both anger (t[72] = 10.85, p < .001, d = 2.56) and neutral feelings (t[72] = 
5.05, p < .001, d = 1.19). Participants in the anger condition reported more anger than both 
gratitude (t[64] = 6.49, p < .001, d = 1.62) and neutral feelings (t[72] = 5.14, p < .001, d = 1.21). 
Participants in the neutral condition reported feeling more neutral than either grateful (t[72] = 
4.64, p = .006, d = 1.09) or angry (t[72] = 8.42, p < .001, d = 1.98). 
The effect of emotions on trust. Our emotion manipulations significantly influenced 
participants’ trust in their advisor, F (2, 104) = 79.62, p < .001, η2 = .61. Participants in the 
gratitude condition were significantly more trusting than were participants in the neutral 
condition (M = 4.67, SD = 0.83 versus M = 2.84, SD = 0.64, t[72] = 10.64, p < .001, d = 2.51) 
and the anger condition (M = 2.39, SD = 0.95, t[68] = 10.74, p < .001, d = 2.60). Participants in 
the anger condition were significantly less trusting than were participants in the neutral condition 
(t[68] = 2.32, p = .02, d = 0.56). 
Advice taking. As in Study 1, and supporting our thesis, the emotion manipulations 
significantly influenced participants’ use of advice, F (2, 103) = 27.28, p < .001, η2 = .35 (see 
Table 2). Participants weighed advice more heavily in the gratitude condition than in both the 
neutral condition (t[72] = 5.00, p < .001, d = 1.18) and the anger condition (t[68] = 6.70, p < 
.001, d = 1.62). Participants weighed advice less heavily in the anger condition than they did in 
the neutral condition (t[68] = 2.11, p = .039, d = 0.51). 
Judgment accuracy. Consistent with the results of Study 1, we found a significant effect 
of emotions on the accuracy of participants’ final estimates, F (2, 104) = 3.20, p < .05, η2 = .06 
(see Table 3). While the accuracy of participants’ initial estimates did not differ across 
conditions (p = .97), the accuracy of final estimates was significantly higher for people in the 
gratitude condition than it was for people in both the neutral condition (t[72] = 1.68, p = .097, d 
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= 0.39) and the anger condition (t[68] = 2.41, p = .019, d = 0.57). Similarly, accuracy improved 
more in the gratitude condition than it did in both the neutral condition (t[72] = 2.11, p = .039, d 
= 0.49) and the anger condition (t[68] = 3.80, p < .001, d = 0.93). The WOA values mediated the 
relationship between emotions and accuracy (see Figure 2; Sobel test, Z = 5.07, p < .001).  
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
Mediation analysis. We next tested the role of trust in mediating the influence of 
incidental emotions on advice taking (Baron & Kenny, 1986). In our first regression, we used 
emotion as the independent variable (1 = gratitude, 0 = anger) and the WOA values as the 
dependent variable, controlling for round (a repeated measure). As expected, this relationship 
was significant (β = .34, p < .001). In the second regression, we tested the relationship between 
emotion and trust, controlling for round. The relationship between emotion and trust was also 
significant and positive (β = 2.29, p < .001), indicating that those in the grateful condition 
reported higher ratings for trust in the advisor than did those in the anger condition. In the final 
step, we included emotion, trust, and round as independent variables and WOA as the dependent 
variable. Supporting our third hypothesis (Sobel test, Z = 4.23, p < .001), the path between 
incidental emotion and advice became insignificant (β = .12, p = .06) when the direct influence 
of trust was included in the regression (β = .10, p < .001). We depict the mediation results in 
Figure 3. 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
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Discussion 
We find that incidental emotions influenced how receptive participants were to advice, 
and that trust mediated the relationship between incidental emotions and advice taking. 
Participants who experienced incidental gratitude were more trusting and more receptive to 
advice than were participants in a neutral emotional state. Participants who experienced 
incidental anger were less trusting and less receptive to advice than were participants in a neutral 
emotional state.  
General Discussion and Conclusion 
Across two studies, we show that incidental emotions influence how receptive people are 
to advice. Participants who experienced incidental gratitude relied upon advice more than 
participants in the neutral condition did, and participants in the neutral condition relied upon 
advice more than participants who experienced incidental anger did. We also find that 
participants who felt incidental gratitude trusted their advisors more than did participants who 
felt incidental anger, and that participants’ feelings of trust mediated the relationship between 
incidental emotions and advice taking. In our setting, the advice participants received was 
helpful and greater reliance upon advice improved accuracy. As a result, participants who 
experienced gratitude (and relied more heavily upon advice) improved their accuracy the most, 
and participants who experienced anger (and relied less heavily upon advice) improved their 
accuracy the least.  
In our studies, we focused on incidental emotions, emotions that are normatively 
unrelated to the actual decision. In practice, people are influenced by both incidental emotions 
(emotion unrelated to the decision) and directed emotions (emotions related to the decision 
context) to influence advice taking. In our experiments, we only focus on incidental emotions 
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because these emotions offer a clean and conservative test of the role of emotions in the advice 
taking process. In practice, the influence of emotions on advice use is likely to be far greater than 
what we observe in these studies.  
Our findings contribute to the literature on advice taking in an important way. Prior 
research suggests that individuals are more receptive to advice when they have rational reasons 
for increasing their reliance upon advice. For example, prior work demonstrates that people rely 
on advice more heavily when the advisor has more experience and more expertise (e.g., Feng & 
MacGeorge, 2006; Harvey & Fischer, 1997; Sniezek et al., 2004). Our results demonstrate that 
normatively irrelevant factors, such as incidental emotions, also influence how heavily 
individuals weigh advice. 
One important implication of this work is that we expect advisors, such as consultants 
and policy makers, who generate anger or are even associated with something that triggers anger, 
to be less trusted and less influential than advisors who are not associated with anger. 
Conversely, we expect advisors who are able to generate gratitude (e.g., by causing targets to 
reflect on their good fortune) to engender more trust and to be more influential than advisors who 
do not generate feelings of gratitude. It is important to note, however, that advisors may 
encounter challenges in generating gratitude. For example, an advisor might generate gratitude 
by offering a gift to the target. If, however, the gift is perceived by the target to be a crude 
gesture designed to curry favor, the act of giving gift may backfire. 
One potential direction for future research is the study of emotional intelligence with 
respect to advice taking. People high in emotional intelligence are able to recognize and change 
the emotions of others (Barling, Slater, & Kelloway, 2000; Goleman, 2005). Our results 
demonstrate that this sensitivity and ability to change others’ emotions may help advisors choose 
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favorable times and manipulate circumstances so that the advice they give will be particularly 
influential.  
Our findings suggest that people receiving advice should be mindful of their emotions. 
People frequently receive advice before making important decisions, and our results identify 
conditions under which people might overweight bad advice or underweight good advice. Before 
consulting others, we should be sure to ask ourselves, are we blinded by anger or are we feeling 
the love? 
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Appendix  
Trust Inventory 
(1) I would give Participant 11 an important letter to mail after s/he mentions that s/he is 
stopping by the post office today.  
(2) I could rely on information Participant 11 provides to me. 
(3) If Participant 11 and I decided to meet for coffee, I would be certain s/he would be there.  
(4) I would expect Participant 11 to tell me the truth if I asked him/her for feedback on an idea 
related to my job or studies.  
(5) If Participant 11 was late to a meeting or an appointment, I would guess there was a good 
reason for the delay.  
(6) Participant 11 would never intentionally misrepresent my point of view to others.  
(7) I would expect Participant 11 to pay me back if I loaned him/her $40. 
(8) If Participant 11 laughed unexpectedly at something I did or said, I would know s/he was not 
being unkind.  
(9) If Participant 11 gave me a compliment on my haircut I would believe s/he meant what was 
said.  
(10) If Participant 11 borrowed something of value and returned it broken, s/he would offer to 
pay for the repairs.  
Note: The trust inventory was adapted from Johnson-George and Swap (1982).
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Tables 
 
Table 1 
Summary of emotion manipulation checks. Each cell reports the average rating across three 
items for each target emotion. We report standard deviations in parentheses 
  Study 1: Average rating  Study 2: Average rating 
  Anger 
condition  
Neutral 
condition 
Gratitude 
condition  
Anger 
condition 
Neutral 
condition  
Gratitude 
condition 
Angry  5.5 
(2.25) 
1.4 
(0.84) 
1.7 
(0.90)  
4.6 
(1.96) 
1.2 
(0.46) 
1.4 
(0.71) 
Unemotional  2.3 
(1.63) 
4.1 
(2.20) 
2.7 
(1.93)  
2.3 
(1.62) 
4.1 
(2.00) 
2.9 
(1.91) 
Grateful  2.0 
(1.78) 
2.8 
(1.58) 
5.5 
(2.23)  
1.8 
(1.47) 
2.2 
(1.40) 
5.2 
(2.03) 
 
 
Table 2 
Summary of WOA results for Study 1 (N = 109; 50% male) and Study 2 (N = 107; 50% male). 
We report standard deviations in parentheses 
Study 1: Average weight of advice  Study 2: Average weight of advice 
Anger 
condition  
(N = 36) 
Neutral 
condition  
(N = 37) 
Gratitude 
condition  
(N = 36) 
 
Anger 
condition  
(N = 33) 
Neutral 
condition  
(N = 37) 
Gratitude 
condition  
(N = 37) 
0.17 
(0.14) 
0.27 
(0.19) 
0.55 
(0.29)  
0.18 
(0.14) 
0.26 
(0.18) 
0.52 
(0.27) 
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Table 3 
Summary of accuracy results. We report standard deviations in parentheses 
  Study 1: Average values  Study 2: Average values 
  Anger 
condition  
Neutral 
condition 
Gratitude 
condition  
Anger 
condition 
Neutral 
condition  
Gratitude 
condition 
Accuracy of 
final 
estimates1 
 19.40 
(11.59) 
17.29 
(7.37) 
13.63 
(6.95)  
20.82 
(10.14) 
18.74 
(8.21) 
15.52 
(8.25) 
Improvement 
in accuracy2 
 4.65 
(4.43) 
4.53 
(3.53) 
9.52 
(7.46)  
3.49 
(2.56) 
5.46 
(4.51) 
8.30 
(6.84) 
  
1 We computed accuracy of final estimates as the absolute difference between each participant’s 
final estimates and the true weight of the person shown in the photograph. 
2 We computed improvement in accuracy as the difference between the accuracy of each 
participant’s initial estimates and the accuracy of their final estimates. 
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Figures Captions 
 
Figure 1. Mediation analysis of WOA, Study 1. We report standardized regression coefficients 
and their significance above each arrow indicating the effect of one variable in predicting 
another. For the effect of incidental emotions on accuracy, we report the total effect of the IV on 
the DV above the arrow, and the coefficient computed when the mediator is also included in the 
regression in parenthesis below the arrow. Note that * p < .05  ** p < .01  *** p < .001 
Figure 2. Mediation analysis of WOA, Study 2. We report standardized regression coefficients 
and their significance above each arrow indicating the effect of one variable in predicting 
another. For the effect of incidental emotions on accuracy, we report the total effect of the IV on 
the DV above the arrow, and the coefficient computed when the mediator is also included in the 
regression in parenthesis below the arrow. Note that * p < .05  ** p < .01  *** p < .001 
Figure 3. Mediation analysis of trust, Study 2. We report standardized regression coefficients 
and their significance above each arrow indicating the effect of one variable in predicting 
another. For the effect of incidental emotions on advice use, we report the total effect of the IV 
on the DV above the arrow, and the coefficient computed when the mediator is also included in 
the regression in parenthesis below the arrow. Note that * p < .05  ** p < .01  *** p < .001 
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Figures 
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Accuracy 
of final 
estimates 
WOA 
Emotion condition 
(1= gratitude, 0 = 
anger) 
0.38*** 12.77*** 
5.77** 
(0.86) 
Advice Use 
(measured by  
WOA) 
Trust 
Emotion condition 
(1= gratitude, 0 = 
anger) 
2.29*** 0.10*** 
0.34*** 
(0.12) 
Accuracy 
of final 
estimates 
WOA 
Emotion condition 
(1= gratitude, 0 = 
anger) 
0.34*** 21.05*** 
5.30** 
(1.74) 
